Justification of Political Authority and the Political Position of the Non-Philosophic Citizen in Plato's "Republic"

Stephen Oppong Peprah

Doctoral thesis

Anotácia:

A traditional and still popular interpretation of Plato’s Republic holds that ruling is the prerogative of the philosopher-rulers because only they have knowledge, and knowledge is necessary for ruling (Fine 1978; Moss 2021; Schwab 2016). And this knowledge is knowledge of the Good. Because this traditional interpretation is associated with the Republic’s metaphysics, I shall call it the metaphysical justification. One key implication of the metaphysical justification is that the non-philosophic citizens, mainly the producers, are excluded from politics because are morally incompetent, intellectually handicapped, and politically inept, because they lack knowledge of the Good (Klosko 2006; Taylor 1997; Vlastos 1941). Therefore, political obligation seems to be slavish returns to the polis, together with its political authority, for the moral and political benefit it promises the citizens. These negative definite descriptions suggest that the non-philosophic citizens are slaves in Kallipolis, at least in the Greek context. The above is what I mean by the political position or worth of the citizens. In this study, I argue against this traditional interpretation. I offer an alternative justification, called the naturalistic justification, concerning how Plato justifies political authority in his just polis and the implication of such justification to understanding the worth of the non-philosophic citizens. The main claim of the naturalistic justification is that the realisability of the eudaemonistic goals of both the individual and the Kallipolis polis supervene upon the cooperative interactions between the rulers and the ruled, qua significant partners, relative to their natural aptitudes and epistemic competencies. This involves accounting for ways in which the non-philosophic citizens can be said to be epistemically competent. The naturalistic justification places a significant premium of value on the operation of social and moral values and principles—including partnership, friendship, harmony—in Plato’s political philosophy (principles which the metaphysical justification seeks to undermine) in the Republic. The result of the study promises to show that the non-philosophic citizen is a significant member of Plato’s just society in the Republic.

Abstract:

A traditional and still popular interpretation in Plato’s Republic holds that ruling is the prerogative of the philosopher-rulers because only they have knowledge, and knowledge is necessary for ruling (Fine 1978; Moss 2021; Schwab 2016). And this knowledge is knowledge of the Good. Because this traditional interpretation is associated with the Republic’s metaphysics, I shall call it the metaphysical justification. One key implication of the metaphysical justification is that the non-philosophic citizens, mainly the producers, are excluded from politics because are morally incompetent, intellectually handicapped, and politically inept, because they lack knowledge of the Good (Klosko 2006; Taylor 1997; Vlastos 1941). Therefore, political obligation seems to be slavish returns to the polis, together with its political authority, for the moral and political benefit it promises the citizens. These negative definite descriptions suggest that the non-philosophic citizens are slaves in Kallipolis, at least in the Greek context. The above is what I mean by the political position or worth of the citizens. In this study, I argue against this traditional interpretation. I offer an alternative justification, called the naturalistic justification, concerning how Plato justifies political authority in his just polis and the implication of such justification to understanding the worth of the non-philosophic citizens. The main claim of the naturalistic justification is that the realisability of the eudaemonistic goals of both the individual and the Kallipolis polis supervene upon the cooperative interactions between the rulers and the ruled, qua significant partners, relative to their natural aptitudes and epistemic competencies. This involves accounting for ways in which the non-philosophic citizens can be said to be epistemically competent. The naturalistic justification places significant premium of value on the operation of social and moral values and principles—including partnership, friendship, harmony—in Plato’s political philosophy (principles which the metaphysical justification seeks to undermine) in the Republic. The result of the study promises to show that the non-philosophic citizen is a significant member of Plato’s just society in the Republic.

Keywords

Justification, metaphysical, philosophers

Jazyk práce: English

Datum vytvoření / odevzdání či podání práce: 7. 6. 2022

Obhajoba závěrečné práce

• Obhajoba proběhla 30. 9. 2022
• Vedúci: doc. Mgr. Jaroslav Daneš, Ph.D.
• Oponent: Pavel Hobza, Frisbee Sheffield

University of Hradec Králové

Faculty of Arts

Doctoral programme / odbor:
Philosophy / Philosophy